High interest rate currencies tend to appreciate. This is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) puzzle. It is primarily a statement about short-term interest rates and how they are related to exchange rates. Short-term interest rates are strongly affected by monetary policy. The UIP puzzle, therefore, can be restated in terms of monetary policy. Do foreign and domestic monetary policies imply exchange rates that violate UIP? We represent monetary policy as foreign and domestic Taylor rules. Foreign and domestic pricing kernels determine the relationship between these Taylor rules and exchange rates. We examine different specifications for the Taylor rule and ask which can resolve the UIP puzzle. We find evidence in favor of a particular asymmetry. If the foreign Taylor rule responds to exchange rate variation but the domestic Taylor rule does not, then the model can resolve the puzzle. * Thanks to Burton Hollifield for many helpful discussions.
Introduction
Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) predicts that high interest rate currencies will depreciate relative to low interest rate currencies. Yet for many currency pairs and time periods we seem to see the opposite. The inability of asset-pricing models to reproduce this fact is what we refer to as the UIP puzzle.
The UIP evidence is primarily about short-term interest rates and currency depreciation rates. Monetary policy exerts substantial influence over short-term interest rates. Therefore, the UIP puzzle might be restated in terms of monetary policy: Why do countries with high interest rate policies have currencies that tend to appreciate relative to those with low interest rate policies? Or, more specifically, if foreign and domestic monetary policies follow simple Taylor rules, and if these Taylor rules affect exchange rates through equilibrium pricing kernels, then can monetary policies account for the UIP evidence?
There is a sizable literature that examines the link between UIP deviations and monetary policy. 1 But unlike much of this literature, we simplify the analysis by ignoring the economic role of money. Following the New Keynesian macroeconomics literature (e.g., Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) ), the policy of the monetary authority acts directly on the short-term interest rate. In other words, monetary policy takes the form of a Taylor rule
where i t is the nominal short-term interest rate, π t is the inflation rate, z t is a "policy shock," and τ and τ 1 are policy parameters. We also assume that the private sector can trade bonds. Therefore the nominal interest rate must also satisfy the standard (nominal) Euler equation,
where n t+1 is the real marginal rate of substitution. An equilibrium inflation rate process must satisfy both of these equations at each point in time, which requires inflation to solve the nonlinear stochastic difference equation:
A solution to equation (3) is an endogenous inflation process, π t , that is jointly determined by the response of monetary authority and the private sector to the same underlying exogenous shocks. By substituting such a solution back into the Euler equation (2), we arrive at what Gallmeyer, Hollifield, Palomino, and Zin (2007) (GHPZ) refer to as a 'monetary policy consistent pricing kernel:' a (nominal) pricing kernel that depends on the Taylor-rule parameters τ and τ 1 . For a two-country complete-markets model, the ratio of these pricing kernels determines the currency depreciation rate,
where S t denotes the nominal exchange rate (price of foreign currency in units of domestic), and asterisks denote foreign variables. Equations (1)-(4) (along with specifications for the shocks) fully characterize the joint distribution of interest rates and exchange rates and, therefore, any departures from UIP.
Given the Taylor rule in (1), we can ask whether the implied exchange rate process in (4) tends to appreciate when the implied interest rate in (2) is relatively low. If so, then the source of UIP deviations can be associated with this Taylor rule. Moreover, we can generalize the specification of the Taylor rule in equation (1) and analyze the consequences of alternative monetary policies for currency exchange rates. In addition, we can ask whether the Taylor rule parameters are identified by the UIP facts. Cochrane (2007) provides examples in which policy parameters and the dynamics of the shocks are not separately identified by the relationship between interest rates and inflation. Our framework has the potential for identifying monetary policy parameters from the properties of currency exchange rates.
In general, exchange rates movements can be driven by both real and nominal factors. We begin, in Section 3, by shutting down the real exchange rate channel so that the focus is exclusively on monetary policy (Section 4 relaxes this strong assumption). This means that n t+1 = e −r and n * t+1 = e −r * , where r and r * denote (constant) real interest rates. It implies that the real exchange rate is constant and that (continuously compounded) relative PPP holds exactly: log(S t+1 /S t ) = π t+1 − π * t+1 . It also implies that, with lognormality, the Euler equation (2) can be written as
Equation (5) indicates that all that really distinguishes our (initial) approach from the benchmark New-Keynesian setup is the conditional variance term. With homoskedastic inflation the nominal interest rate would satisfy the Fisher equation (up to a constant), the difference equation (3) would be linear, and the solution for inflation would be in the same class as, say, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) . What would also be true, however, is that UIP would be satisfied (up to a constant) and Fama's (1984) well-known regression of the depreciation rate on the interest rate differential would yield a (population) slope coefficient of 1.0. Our paper would be finished before it even began. Stochastic volatility, therefore, is not a choice, it is a requirement. But since inflation is an endogenous process, we cannot simply assert a stochastic volatility process for inflation. Rather we must solve for the relationship between Taylor rule parameters, stochastic volatility and deviations from UIP.
An important precursor to our paper is McCallum (1994) , which also derives implications for UIP as the solution to a linear rational expectations model characterized by a policy-type interest rate rule. We extend McCallum's work by endogenizing the currency risk premium which, in his paper, is exogenous. 2 This is an important step since it constrains the sense in which the UIP anomaly is driven by endogenous equilibrium inflation risk. That is, in our model, a shock is realized, the Taylor rule responds to that shock, and as a result so does inflation. Whether or not this shock commands a risk premium depends on the parameters of the model. We can then ask if the way in which monetary policy reacts to shocks is consistent with risk premiums that are capable of creating sizable deviations from UIP.
Pricing Kernels and Currency Risk Premiums
We begin with a terse treatment of existing results in order to fix notation. The logarithm of the spot and one-period forward exchange rates, in units of U.S. dollars (USD) per unit of foreign currency (say, British pounds, GBP), are denoted s t and f t . USD and GBP one-period interest rates (continuously compounded) are denoted i t and i * t . Covered interest parity implies that f t − s t = i t − i * t . Fama's (1984) decomposition of the interest rate differential (forward premium) is
This decomposition expresses the forward premium as the sum of q t , the expected USD depreciation rate, and p t , the expected payoff on a forward contract to receive USD and deliver GBP. We define the latter as the foreign currency risk premium. We define uncovered interest parity (UIP) as p t = 0. The well-known rejections of UIP are manifest in negative estimates of the parameter b from the regression
2 Engel and West (2006) also study a model of how Taylor rules affect exchange rates. Their analysis, while focusing on a different set of questions, is related to McCallum's in that they interpret their 'policy shock' as an amalgamation of an actual policy shock and an exogenous risk premium. Our paper relates to theirs in that both derive an exchange rate process as the solution to a forward-looking difference equation. The main difference is that our deviations from UIP are endogenous.
The population regression coefficient can be written
Fama (1984) noted that necessary conditions for b < 0 are
Our approach begins with the standard pricing-kernel equation,
where b n t is the U.S. dollar (USD) price of a nominal n-period zero-coupon bond at date t and m t is the pricing kernel for USD-denominated assets. The oneperiod interest rate is i t ≡ − log b 1
t . An equation analogous to (12) defines the GBP-denominated pricing kernel, m * t , in terms of GBP-denominated bond prices, Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) translate Fama's (1984) decomposition into pricing kernel language. First, assume complete markets so that the currency depreciation rate is
Fama's (1984) decomposition becomes
where equation (17) is only valid for the case of conditional lognormality. Basically, Fama's (1984) conditions state that the means and the variances must move in opposite directions and that the variation in the variances must exceed that of the means.
Our objective is to write down a model in which b < 0. Inspection of equations (10) and (17) indicate that a necessary condition is that p t vary over time and that, for the lognormal case, the log kernels must exhibit stochastic volatility.
Nominal Exchange Rates and Taylor Rules
Domestic (U.S.) monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule of the form
where π t is the (continuously-compounded) inflation rate and z t is a 'policy shock'. There are many alternative specifications for Taylor rules. A good discussion related to asset pricing is Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007) . We begin with this relatively simple specification for reasons of tractability and clarity.
The process for z t is a AR(1) with stochastic volatility:
where ε t and w t are i.i.d. standard normal. Recall that stochastic volatility is not an option. It is a requirement. The only issue is where it comes from. Since our goal is to emphasize monetary policy we specify stochastic volatility as arising from the nominal policy rule.
Turning to asset pricing, nominal pricing kernel, m t+1 = n t+1 exp(−π t+1 ), is comprised of a real piece n t+1 and nominal piece, exp(−π t+1 ). The (nominal) short interest rate rate is i t = − log E t m t+1 . As discussed in the introduction, we turn off the real component of the kernel, implying that
where, for simplicity, we've set the real interest rate to zero. The Taylor rule (18) and the Euler equation (22) imply that inflation must satisfy the following difference equation:
Guess that the solution has the form,
Instead of solving equation (23) forward, just substitute equation (24) into the Euler equation (22), compute the moments, and then solve for the a i coefficients by matching up the result with the Taylor rule (18). This gives,
where
Inflation and the short rate are:
The pricing kernel can now be written
Now consider a foreign country, say the U.K.. Denote all foreign variables with an asterisk. The foreign Taylor rule is
t . with z * t and its volatility following processes analogous to equations (C1-C1) in which (for now) the shocks may be correlated across countries. Repeating the above calculations for the U.K. and then substituting the results into equations (14-17) we get
Result 1: Symmetry and ϕ z = 0
If all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same and ϕ z = ϕ * z = 0, then the UIP regression parameter (9) is:
Discussion
The sign of Cov (p t , q t ) does not depend on ϕ z . That is, Cov (p t , q t ) is essentially the covariance between the kernel's mean and its variance and, while v t appears in both, z t appears only in the mean. The assumption ϕ z = 0 is therefore relatively innocuous in the sense that it has no effect on one of the two necessary conditions (10) and (11).
We require τ 1 > 1 for the solution to make sense. Therefore, according to equation (38), 0 < b < 1 unless ϕ v < 0. The latter is implausible. Nevertheless, the UIP regression coefficient can be significantly less than unity and the joint distribution of exchange rates and interest rates will admit positive expected excess returns on a suitably-defined trading strategy.
We cannot, at this point, account for b < 0. But the model does deliver some insights into our basic question of how Taylor rules restrict inflation dynamics and, consequently, exchange rate dynamics. We summarize with several remarks.
Remark 1: This is not just a relabeled affine model
Inspection of the pricing kernel, equation (32), indicates that it is basically a log-linear function of two unobservable factors. Is what we are doing just a relabeling of the class of latent-factor affine models described in Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) ? The answer is no and the reason is that the Taylor rule imposes economically-meaningful restrictions on the model's coefficients.
To see this consider a pricing kernel of the form
where v t is an arbitrary, positive stochastic process, and an analogous expression describes m * t+1 . Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) show that such a structure generates a UIP coefficient b < 0 if β > 0 and β < γ 2 /2. The former condition implies that the mean and variance of negative the log kernel move in the same direction -this gives Cov (p t , q t ) < 0 -and the latter implies that the variance is more volatile so that Var (p t ) > Var (q t ). Now compare equations (39) and (32). The Taylor rule imposes the restrictions that β can only be positive if ϕ v is negative (because a 2 < 0 since τ 1 > 1) and that β = σ v ϕ v γ. Moreover, both β and γ are restricted by value of the policy parameter τ 1 . In words, the UIP evidence requires the mean and the variance of the pricing kernel to move in particular ways relative to each other. The Taylor rule and its implied inflation dynamics place binding restrictions on how this can happen. The unrestricted pricing kernel in equation (39) can account for b < 0 irrespective of the dynamics of v t . Imposing the Taylor rule says that v t must be negatively autocorrelated.
Remark 2:
Reason that negatively-correlated volatility is necessary for b < 0?
First, note that a 2 < 0, so that an increase in volatility v t decreases inflation π t . Why? Suppose not. Suppose that v t increases. Then, since τ 1 > 1, the Taylor rule implies that the interest rate i t must increase by more than inflation π t . However this contradicts the stationarity of inflation which implies that the conditional mean must increase by less than the contemporaneous value. Hence a 2 < 0. A similar argument implies that a 1 < 0 from equation (24). The point is that the dynamics of Taylor-rule implied inflation, at least until we get the real interest rate involved in Section 4, are driven by the muted response of the interest rate to a shock, relative to that of the inflation rate.
Next, to understand why ϕ v < 0 is necessary for b < 0, consider again an increase in volatility v t . Since a 2 < 0, the U.S. interest rate i t and the contemporaneous inflation rate π t must decline. But for b < 0 USD must be expected to depreciate. This means that, although π t decreases, E t π t+1 must increase. This means that volatility must be negatively autocorrelated.
Finally, consider the more plausible case of positively autocorrelated volatility, 0 < ϕ v < 1. Then b < 1 which is, at least, going in the right direction (e.g., Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) show that the vanilla Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model generates b > 1). The reasoning, again, derives from the 'muted response of the interest rate' behavior required by the Taylor rule. This implies that Cov (p t , q t ) > 0 -thus violating Fama's condition (10) -which says that if inflation and expected inflation move in the same direction as the interest rate (because ϕ v > 0), then so must the USD currency risk premium. The regression (8) can be written
Even more starkly, consider the case of ϕ v = 0 so that b = 0. Then the exchange rate is a random walk -i.e., q t = 0 so that s t = E t s t+1 -and all variation in the interest rate differential is variation in the risk premium, p t . Taylor rule inflation dynamics, therefore, say that for UIP to be a good approximation, changes in volatility must show up strongly in the conditional mean of inflation and that this can only happen if volatility is highly autocorrelated.
Remark 3: Identification of policy parameters
Cochrane (2007) provides examples where policy parameters like τ 1 are impossible to distinguish from the parameters of the unobservable shocks. Result 1 bears similarity to Cochrane's simplest example. We can estimate b from data but, if we can't estimate ϕ v directly then there are many combinations of ϕ v and τ 1 that are consistent with any estimate of b.
Identification in our special case, however, is possible because of the conditional variance term in the interest rate equation: i t = E t π t+1 − Var t π t+1 . To see this note that, with ϕ z = 0, the autocorrelation of the interest rate is ϕ v and, therefore, ϕ v is identified by observables. Moreover,
which identifies τ 1 because the variables on the left side are observable.
The more general case of ϕ z = 0 doesn't work out as cleanly, but it appears that the autocorrelation of inflation and the interest rate jointly identify ϕ z and ϕ v and the above ratio again identifies the policy parameter τ 1 . These results are all special cases of those described in Backus and Zin (2008) .
Asymmetric Taylor Rules
The series of affine models outlined in Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) suggest that asymmetries between the foreign and domestic pricing kernels are likely to play a critical role in achieving b < 0. Their approach is purely statistical in nature. There are many parameters and few sources of guidance for which asymmetries are plausible and which are not. This section asks if foreign and domestic Taylor rule asymmetries are plausible candidates.
Suppose that foreign and domestic Taylor rules depend on the exchange rate in addition to domestic inflation and a policy shock:
where d t is the contemporaneous USD depreciation rate, d t = log(S t /S t−1 ). The asymmetry that we'll impose is that τ 3 = 0 so that the Fed does not react to the depreciation rate whereas the Bank of England does. Foreign central banks reacting more to USD exchange rates seems plausible. It's also consistent with some empirical evidence in, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Engel and West (2006), and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) .
Assuming the same processes for the state variables as equations (C1) and (C1) (and their foreign counterparts), guess that the inflation solutions look like:
and collect the state variables into the vector
Interest rates, from Euler equations with real interest rate = 0, must satisfy:
where,
The solution for the a coefficients and the following result are provided in Appendix C.
Result 2: Asymmetric reaction to exchange rates
If foreign and domestic Taylor rules are equations (40) and (41), with τ 3 = 0 and all remaining foreign and domestic parameter values the same, then b < 0 if τ * 3 > τ 1 .
Remark 4: Pathological policy behavior?
Interpreted literally, τ * 3 > 0 means that the Bank of England reacts to an appreciation in GBP by increasing the British interest rate. However, at the same time, there exist sensible calibrations of the model in which Cov (i * t , log(S t /S t−1 )) > 0. This makes the obvious point that the Taylor rule coefficients must be interpreted with caution since all the endogenous variables in the rule are responding to the same shocks.
McCallum's Model
McCallum (1994), equation (17), posits a policy rule of the form
where ζ t is a policy shock. He also defines UIP to include an exogenous shock, ξ t , so that
McCallum solves the implicit difference equation for s t − s t−1 and finds that it takes the form
He specifies values σ = 0.8 and λ = 0.2 -justified by the policy-makers desire to smooth interest rates and 'lean-into-the-wind' regarding exchange rates -which resolve the UIP puzzle by implying a regression coefficient from our equation (8) of b = −4. McCallum's insight was, recognizing the empirical evidence of a risk premium in the interest rate differential, to understand that the policy rule and the equilibrium exchange rate must respond to the same shock that drives the risk premium.
In this section we show that McCallum's result can be recast in terms of our pricing kernel model and a policy rule that targets the interest rate itself, not the interest rate differential. The key ingredient is a lagged interest rate in the policy rule:
where the processes for z t and its volatility v t are the same as above. Guess that the solution for endogenous inflation is:
Substitute equation (46) into the pricing kernel and compute the expectation:
Match-up the coefficients with the Taylor rule and solve for the a j parameters:
It's useful to note that
and that matching coefficients imply
The pricing kernel is
The GBP-denominated kernel and variables are denoted with asterisks. If we assume that all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same (i.e., τ = τ * ), the interest-rate differential, the expected depreciation rate, q t , and the risk premium, p t , are:
It is easily verified that p t + q t = i t − i * t . The nominal interest rate and the interest rate differential have the same autocorrelation:
If we set ϕ z = 0, then the regression parameter is:
To see the similarity to McCallum's model define ζ ≡ z t − z * t , and subtract the U.K. Taylor rule from its U.S. counterpart in (45). Assuming symmetry, we get
where the second equality follows from market completeness and our simple pricing kernel model. This is the same as McCallum's policy rule with τ 1 = λ and τ 4 = σ. His UIP "shock" is the same as our p t = −a 2 1 (v t − v * t )/2, with ϕ z = ϕ v = 0. With ϕ v = 0 we get the same UIP regression coefficient, −τ 4 /τ 1 . McCallum's model is basically a two-country Taylor rule model with a lagged interest rate in the policy rule and no dynamics in the shocks. Allowing for autocorrelated volatility diminishes the model's ability to account for a substantially negative UIP coefficient, a feature that McCallum's approach does not recognize. A value of b < 0 can only be achieved if volatility is less autocorrelated that the value of the interest rate smoothing policy parameter.
Summary
The goal of this section has been to ascertain how the imposition of a monetary policy, interest rate rule restricts inflation dynamics and how these restrictions are manifest in the exchange rate. What have we learned?
A good context for understanding the answer is the Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2008) (AAK) paper. The nuts and bolts of their argument goes as follows. With lognormality, the nominal interest is
AAK argue that if exchange rates follow a random walk then variation in the conditional mean term must be small. 3 Therefore (according to them), "almost everything we say about monetary policy is wrong." The idea is that, in many existing models, the monetary policy transmission mechanism works through its affect on the conditional mean of the nominal marginal rate of substitution, m t . But if exchange rates imply that the conditional mean is essentially a constant -so that 'everything we say is wrong' -then the mechanism must instead be working through the conditional variance.
If one takes the UIP evidence seriously, this isn't quite right. The UIP puzzle requires variation in the conditional means (i.e., it says that exchange rates are not a random walk). 4 Moreover, it also requires that this variation be negatively correlated with variation in the conditional variances, and that the latter be larger than the former. In terms of monetary policy the message is that the standard story -that a shock that increases the mean (of the marginal rate of substitution) decreases the interest rate -is wrong. The UIP evidence says that we need to get used to thinking about a shock that increases the mean as increasing the interest rate, the reason being that the same shock must decrease the variance, and by more than it increases the mean.
Now, to what we've learned. We've learned that symmetric monetary policies as represented by Taylor rules of the form (18) can't deliver inflation dynamics that, by themselves, satisfy these requirements. The reason is basically what we label the 'muted response of the short rate'. The evidence requires that the conditional 3 i.e., random walk exchange rates mean that Et log(St+1/St) = 0, and, from equation (15), Et log(St+1/St) = −Et(log mt+1 − log m * t+1 ). Random walk exchange rates, therefore, imply that the difference between the mean of the log kernels does not vary, not the mean of the log kernels themselves. More on this below.
4 Of course, the variation in the forecast error for exchange rates dwarfs the variation in the conditional mean (i.e., the R 2 from the Fama-regressions is very small). Monthly changes in exchange rates certainly exhibit 'near random walk' behavior, and for policy questions the distinction may be a second-order effect. This argument, however, does not affect our main point regarding the AAK paper: that exchange rates are all about differences between pricing kernels and its hard to draw definitive conclusions about their levels. mean of inflation move by more than its contemporaneous value. But the one clear restriction imposed by the Taylor rule -that the interest rate must move less than contemporaneous inflation because the interest rate must also be equal to the conditional mean future inflation -says that this can't happen (unless volatility is negatively autocorrelated). This depends heavily on the real interest rate being a constant, something we relax in the next section.
So, is the model doomed? The second thing that we've learned is that, no, it isn't. The reason is related to something else that AAK don't quite get right. Exchange rate behavior tells us something about the difference between the domestic and foreign pricing kernels, not necessarily something about their levels. The above logic, and AAK's logic, is about levels, not differences. Symmetry makes the distinction irrelevant, but with asymmetry it's important. What our asymmetric example delivers is (i) inflation dynamics that, in each currency, satisfies 'muted response of the short rate' behavior, and (ii) a difference in inflation dynamics that gets the difference in the mean and the variance of the kernels moving in the right direction.
To see this, recall that X t ≡ z t z * t v t v * t and consider the foreign and domestic pricing kernels in the asymmetric model:
where Λ is a diagonal matrix of autoregressive coefficients, and V (X t ) is a diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations. The asymmetric restriction that τ 3 = 0 and τ * 3 = 0 effectively makes this a 'common factor model' with asymmetric loadings on the common factors. A number of recent papers, Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) for example, have argued persuasively for such a specification. What we've developed is one economic interpretation of their statistical exercise. 5
More explicitly, consider the difference in the mean and variance of the log kernels from the symmetric and asymmetric examples of Sections 3 and 3.2. For the symmetric case we have
whereas for the asymmetric case we have
Note that if the conditional mean coefficients on zt and vt were the same across m and m * then, contrary to AAK's assertion, monetary policy could affect the mean of the pricing kernel while still allowing for a random walk exchange rate. This is simply because zt and vt would not appear in the difference between the means of the two log kernels.
where the a coefficients are functions of the model's parameters, outlined above and in more detail in the appendix. What's going on in the symmetric case is transparent. p t and q t can only be negatively correlated if ϕ v < 0 (since a 2 < 0). The asymmetric case is more complex, but it turns out that what's critical is that (a 3 − a * 3 ) < 0. This in turn depends on the difference (τ 1 − τ * 3 ) being negative. Overall, what the asymmetric Taylor rule does is that it introduces an asymmetry in how a common factor between m and m * affect their conditional means. This asymmetry causes the common factor to show up in exchange rates, and it can also flip the sign and deliver b < 0 with the right combination of parameter values.
Real Exchange Rates and Taylor Rules
We now incorporate real exchange rate variability and an interaction between real exchange rates and endogenous inflation. There are no nominal frictions in the model and thus monetary policy has no impact on real variables. The model features real shocks only. These shocks directly affect the real pricing kernel and, through the Taylor rules, the inflation process and the depreciation rate.
Domestic and a foreign representative agents have Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ) preferences described by the solution to the following recursive equations:
where β and β * characterize impatience, ρ and ρ * measure the preference for intertemporal substitution, and the certainty equivalents of random future utility are specified as
where α and α * measure static relative risk aversion (RRA). Both α and ρ are defined for values not greater than one. The relative magnitude of α and ρ determines whether agents prefer early resolution of risk (α < ρ), late resolution of risk (α > ρ), or are indifferent to the timing of resolution of risk (α = ρ). The domestic marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is
An equivalent expression can be obtained for the foreign representative agent. Standard time and state separable utility corresponds to the case in which α = ρ. The nominal pricing kernel from equation (12) now takes the form
and, with complete markets, the nominal depreciation rate is defined by log(s t+1 /s t ) = log(m * t+1 /m t+1 ). We are silent on the risk-sharing mechanism that supports the consumption allocations inherent in n t+1 and n * t+1 . We simply exploit the fact that, if domestic and foreign representative agents have recursive preferences and consumption processes that match the data then, with complete markets, the ratios of nominal and real pricing kernels will equal nominal and real depreciation rates. Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008), Colacito and Croce (2008) , Gavazzoni (2008) and others follow a similar approach.
We next proceed by further specifying n t , followed by a Taylor rule and the solution for π t .
Consumption Growth and the Real Pricing Kernel
We assume that we observe the equilibrium consumption allocations in each country and specify the dynamics of their growth rates as heteroskedastic processes with both country-specific and world shocks. Domestic and foreign consumption growth evolve according to
where the process for the world volatility w evolves according to
and the country-specific stochastic volatility processes v and v * are
. The innovations are multivariate normal: 
where κ is a linearization coefficient. It's useful to note that the factor loadings and prices of risk are linked according to: 
and its conditional variance is
The conditional mean depends both on consumption growth and stochastic volatility, whereas the conditional variance is a linear function of current stochastic volatility only.
The real short rate is
Assuming symmetry, the expression for the expected real depreciation q r t , the forward premium f r t − s r t and the risk premium p r t are:
Result 3: Symmetry
If all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same, then the real UIP regression parameter, obtained by the regressing the real interest rate differential on the real depreciation rate is:
where s r t = log S r t and f r t = log F r t are the log real spot and forward exchange rate, respectively, and
. Without the presence of both stochastic volatility in consumption growth and EZ preferences, b r is equal to one and, in real terms, UIP holds identically.
The last expression for b r makes it clear that for γ r v − (λ r x,v ) 2 /2 < 0, we get b r < 1 and a negative UIP slope is possible whenever |γ r v −(λ r x,v ) 2 /2| is large enough. Also, when consumption is not autocorrelated (ϕ x = 0), the expression above simplifies to
6 Symmetry means that all the parameters are the same across countries, including ςw = ς * w and ςv = ς * v , i.e. symmetry in the sensitivity of consumption growth to the world and country specific volatility. Similarly to the previous section, the model can be extended to allow for asymmetric loadings and asymmetric state variables.
Taylor Rule and Endogenous Inflation
Domestic monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule in which the short interest rate depends on contemporaneous inflation and output growth:
There is no policy shock. Given the level of output and inflation, the interest rate is uniquely pinned down by the choice of the Taylor rule parameters.
Following the technique developed in the previous section, guess that the solution for endogenous inflation has the form
and substitute it into the Euler equation (2), compute the moments, and then solve for the a j coefficients by matching up the result with the Taylor rule (74). This gives,
The linearized nominal pricing kernel is
The Taylor rule parameters, through their determination of the equilibrium inflation process, affect both the factor loadings on the real factors as well as their prices of risk. This would not be the case if the inflation process was exogenously specified.
The nominal short rate is
The nominal interest rate differential, the expected depreciation rate and the risk premium can be easily derived from equations (14-17). Assuming symmetry across countries, we have
Result 4:
If all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same, the nominal UIP slope coefficient is
As was the case for the real UIP slope coefficient, for γ v − (λ x,v ) 2 /2 < 0, we get b < 1 and a negative UIP slope is possible whenever |γ v − (λ x,v ) 2 /2| is large enough. Also, when consumption is not autocorrelated (ϕ x = 0), the expression above simplifies to
Discussion
The results obtained in this section rely crucially on three ingredients: EZ preferences, stochastic volatility and the choice of the Taylor rule parameters. We analyze their impact on the UIP slope coefficient and risk premium here below.
Remark 5: With EZ preferences, volatility is priced as a separate source of risk
From the previous section, we learned that if we want to explain the UIP puzzle we need stochastic volatility. In the model with real exchange rate variability, stochastic volatility comes from consumption growth, in the form of a country specific factor and a world factor. With symmetric parameters, the world factor does not enter the expressions for the expected depreciation q t , the forward premium f t − s t and the risk premium p t . Therefore, we focus on the role played by country specific volatility v t . Notice from equation (71) that with standard expected utility (α = ρ), both the real factor loading γ r v and the real price of risk λ r v collapse to zero. EZ preferences allow agents to receive a compensation for taking volatility risk, to which they would not be entitled with standard time-additive expected utility preferences. The contemporaneous presence of both stochastic volatility and EZ preferences is needed to explain the anomaly in real terms. Without stochastic volatility in the real pricing kernel, the real currency risk premium is constant and both of Fama's condition are violated. Without EZ preferences, stochastic volatility in consumption growth is not priced at all.
Remark 6: The role of the Taylor parameters in the UIP slope coefficient Assume for simplicity that consumption growth is not autocorrelated, that is ϕ x = 0. In this case, the real and nominal UIP slope coefficient simplify to
Equation (76) and (71) make it clear that b r , the real UIP slope coefficient, depends exclusively on the relative magnitude of risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Only when agents have preference for the early resolution of risk (α < ρ), we get b r < 0. This is in line with the findings of Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008) and Gavazzoni (2008).
When we look at the nominal UIP slope b, the Taylor rules parameters come into play. The result is that different values of τ π and τ x can emphasize, mute, or even reverse the impact of the timing of resolution of uncertainty on the UIP slope coefficient. Indeed, we can show that there exist sets of preference parameters and Taylor rule parameters for which the real interest rate differential covaries positively with the expected real depreciation rate, but for which their nominal counterparts covary negatively, thus delivering results consistent with the UIP puzzle. To see this, notice from equation (76) that b r < 0 when γ r v and γ r v − (λ r x,v ) 2 /2 have opposite sign. Clearly, this is possible only with a positive numerator and a negative denominator. But, with a careful choice of the τ parameters we can get the required b < 0, even when the denominator of the real UIP slope, γ r v −(λ r x,v ) 2 /2, is positive.
This feature is peculiar to our model with Taylor rules and endogenous inflation. Simply appending an exogenous inflation process to the real part of the model would not create this endogenous interaction between real and nominal variables but simply add a state variable to the problem. What we show is that there exists policy parameters consistent with the UIP evidence. This is far from saying that monetary policy is causing the carry trade behavior of interest rates, but suggest the existence of a non trivial connection between policy parameters, inflation and exchange rate behavior.
Remark 7: The role of persistence in country specific volatility Similarly to the purely nominal examples of section 3, the persistence of country specific volatility ϕ v plays a crucial role in the determination of the sign of the UIP slope. Too see this, consider again for simplicity the case in which consumption is not autocorrelated. In this case, as we have seen above, the real UIP slope coefficient b r depends exclusively on the preference parameters. Instead, even when the consumption channel is shut down, the nominal UIP slope coefficient b is also affected by the parameters driving the country specific stochastic volatility process, in particular by its autocorrelation ϕ v . This is a direct consequence of endogenizing inflation and deriving the GHPZ monetary policy consistent pricing kernel. From equation (76) we have,
Again, we need the numerator to be positive and the denominator to be negative. Notice that, when ϕ v = 0, the numerator of b, the factor loading of stochastic volatility, is unaffected by monetary policy, i.e. γ r v = γ v . Instead, when ϕ v = 0, we have to take care of ϕ v , which enters the formula for the factor loading of volatility, γ v , both directly and indirectly, through its effect on a 2 . In our main calibration, we will have a 2 < 0, and therefore γ v < γ r v whenever ϕ v > 0. In general, it is therefore harder to get the numerator of b to be positive. For given Taylor rule parameters, as the persistence of volatility increases, it gets harder to obtain a negative UIP slope coefficient. On the other hand, as pointed out in the previous remark, for given processes followed by the state variables, a careful choice of Taylor parameters can deliver the required Fama conditions.
Calibration
Ideally, we would like the model to reproduce a negative nominal UIP slope coefficient, together with persistent and large interest rate differentials, a near random walk behavior of nominal (and real) exchange rate, not so volatile inflation processes, and nominal and real exchange rate closely tied to each other. Also, we would like to have sensible consumption, both within and across countries. As we have shown, our task is complicated by the lower number of free parameters we have due to the fact that we incorporate Taylor rules for interest rate behavior. Consequently, when comparing our model's fit to the one of a model with exogenous inflation, we necessarily do worse. On the positive side, we can benefit from the lower dimensionality of the problem, which facilitates the economic interpretation of the parameters and has the potential to alleviate their identification issues.
We calibrate the real side of the model to reproduce the mean, variance and autocorrelation of the consumption growth process specified in Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008) and study the anomaly for U.S. monthly data. The parameters for the baseline calibration are shown in table 1. In particular, the monthly average consumption growth is equal to 0.15%, with a monthly unconditional volatility of 0.8%. We set the first order autocorrelation in consumption growth equal to 0.
The parameters of country specific volatility and world volatility, together with he sensitivity of consumption growth to these state variables, are chosen to match the unconditional volatility and the autocorrelation in consumption growth. The persistence of country specific volatility is equal to 0, while the prersistence of the world volatility factor is set at 0.997.
The cross-country correlation in consumption growth is around 0.35. This value is consistent with Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) which report correlation coefficients in the range of 0.24 and 0.42 for consumption growth between the U.S. and other industrialized countries. Nominal interest rate data are taken from Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008) and inflation data are taken from Gallmeyer, Hollifield, Palomino, and Zin (2007) . The discount factor β is set equal to 0.9988 and the country specific volatility processes v t are assumed to be uncorrelated. This captures the intuition that, in the short run, economies with the same intrinsic features can be hit by uncorrelated volatility shocks. The level of relative risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution are set equal to 1.5. This implies that agents in the economy have a preference for the early resolution of risk. Table 2 reports the results. By construction, we match the mean, autocorrelation and volatility of consumption growth and the average level of inflation and nominal interest rate. The implied autocorrelation of the nominal interest rate is high (99%) and close to what we observe in the data. The implied inflation process has an annualized mean of 4.25%. The implied nominal UIP slope coefficient is equal to -0.23 and the volatility of the nominal depreciation rate is 20.34%, which is close to what we observe in the data. Recall that Fama's conditions are satisfied when the risk premium is more variable than the expected depreciation rate and covaries negatively with it. To illustrate this, figure 1 shows a simulated path for the currency risk premium p and the expected depreciation rate q.
Given that we shut down the consumption growth channel by setting its persistence equal to zero, the volatility of the real short rate is very low. However, as discussed in the previous section, an accurate choice of Taylor rule parameters can amplify the variability of nominal variables allowing us to obtain values for Var (i t ) and Var (π t ) which are in line with the data. Figure 2 and 3 show simulated paths for the nominal domestic interest rate and inflation, i and π t , and a comparison between the domestic and foreign inflation rate, π and π * . As a consequence of the complete symmetry of the model, these variables have very similar processes across countries. Again, this limitation can be overcome by allowing for asymmetric loadings.
The Taylor rule sensitivity to consumption growth is small and positive. A 1% increase in consumption growth implies a 1 basis point increase in the nominal interest rate. The Taylor rule sensitivity to inflation, τ π , is equal to 1.004. The interpretetion of this parameter has to take into account that inflation is an endogenous variable to the problem and reacts to the same shocks affecting the interest rate.
Consistently with the data, the real and the nominal exchange rate are very highly correlated. Also, they look very close to being a random walk. This can be seen from the usual variance decomposition formula
The first term of equation (77), which is often referred as the unexplained component of the unconditional variance, accounts for 99.9% of the volatility of the depreciation rate. Moreover, the persistence of the depreciation rate is very low. Figure 4 and 5 show simulated paths for the nominal exchange rate and the nominal depreciation rate.
Conclusions
How is monetary policy related to the UIP puzzle? Ever since we've known about the apparent profitability of the currency carry trade people have speculated about a lurking role played by monetary policy. The story is that, for some reason, central banks find themselves on the short side of the trade, borrowing high yielding currencies to fund investments in low yielding currencies. In certain cases this has seemed almost obvious. It's well known, for instance, that in recent years the Reserve Bank of India has been accumulating USD reserves and, at the same time, sterilizing the impact on the domestic money supply through contractionary open-market operations. Since Indian interest rates have been relatively high, this policy basically defines what it means to be on the short side of the carry trade. This leads one to ask if carry trade losses are in some sense a cost of implementing Indian monetary policy? If so, is this a good policy? Is there some sense in which it is causing the exchange rate behavior associated with the carry trade? Our paper's questions, while related, are less ambitious than these speculations about India. What we've shown goes as follows. It is almost a tautology that we can represent exchange rates as ratios of nominal pricing kernels in different currency units:
.
It is less a tautology (but not too far off) that we can write down sensible stochastic processes for these four variables that are consistent with the carry trade evidence. 7 Previous work has shown that such processes have many parameters that are difficult to identify with sample moments of data. Our paper shows two things.
First, that by incorporating a Taylor rule for interest rate behavior we reduce the number of parameters. Doing so is sure to deteriorate the model's fit. But the benefit is lower dimensionality and parameters that are economically interpretable. Second, we've shown that some specifications of Taylor rules work and others don't. This seems helpful in and of itself. It also shows that there exist policy rules which, when combined with sensible pricing kernels, are consistent with the carry trade evidence. This is a far cry from saying that policy is causing carry trade behavior in interest rates and exchange rates, but it does suggest a connection that we find intriguing. In our models, for instance, there exist changes in the policy parameters, τ 1 and τ 3 , under which the carry trade profits go away.
Finally, it's worth noting that India, of course, is much more the exception than the rule. Most central banks -especially if we limit ourselves to those from OECD countries -don't have such explicit, foreign-currency related policies. However, many countries do use nominal interest rate targeting to implement domestic policy and, therefore, we can think about central banks and the carry trade in a consolidated sense. For example, in early 2004 the U.K. less U.S. interest rate differential was around 3%. If we could somehow measure the changes in the Fed's and the Bank of England's balance sheets that were required to implement and sustain these policies, and if we consolidated what we find onto a single balance sheet, would we conclude that these two central banks were short the carry trade? 
Appendix A Symmetric Model
The short rate must satisfy both the Euler equation and the Taylor rule:
where the processes for z t and its volatility v t are
where ε t and w t are i.i.d. standard normal. Given that m t+1 = n t+1 P t /P t+1 and π t+1 = log(P t+1 /P t ), set the real pricing kernel to a constant and guess that the solution for endogenous inflation is:
Substitute equation (A5) into the pricing kernel and compute the expectation in equation (A1):
Match-up the coefficients with the Taylor rule and solve for the a i parameters:
Note that this is the same as saying that
Similarly, a 1 = 1/(ϕ z − τ 1 ) is the same as saying that
Both of these things are kind of trivial. They just say that the effect of a shock on the Taylor rule equation must be consistent with the effect on the Euler equation.
Note also that
The GBP-denominated kernel and variables are denoted with asterisks. The interest-rate differential, the expected depreciation rate, q t , and the risk premium, p t , are:
It is easily verified that p t + q t = i t − i * t . If we assume that all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same (i.e., τ = τ * ) and if we set ϕ z = 0, then the regression parameter is:
where ι z ≡ [ 1 0 0 0 ] and ι * z ≡ [ 0 1 0 0 ]. Matching-up the coefficients means
To solve for the constants (the first two equations):
where stuf f and stuf f * are everything on the LHS of the solutions for C and C * , except the first terms, a and a * .
The B equations are eight equations in eight unknowns, A and A * . Conditional on these, the C equations are two-in-two, a and a * . The B equations can be broken into 4 blocks of 2. It's useful to write them out because you can see where the singularity lies.
2 /2 Two singularities exist:
• UIP holds exactly. If τ 3 = 0 (so that the Fed ignores the FX rate), ϕ v = ϕ * v and τ 1 = τ * 1 (complete symmetry in parameters, save τ 3 and τ * 3 ) then a singularity is τ * 3 = τ 1 − ϕ v . As τ * 3 approaches this from below or above, the UIP coefficient goes to 1.0.
• Anomaly resolved. Similarly, if τ 3 = 0, ϕ v = ϕ * v and τ 1 = τ * 1 then a singularity is τ * 3 = τ 1 . As τ * 3 approaches from below, the UIP coefficient goes to infinity. As τ * 3 approaches from above, it goes to negative infinity.
The latter condition is where the UIP regression coefficient changes sign. This says that we need τ * 3 > τ 3 . This may seem pathological. It says that -if we interpret these coefficients as policy responses (which we shouldn't) -the ECB responds to an appreciation in EUR by increasing interest rates more than 1:1 (and more than the 'Taylor principle' magnitude of τ 1 > 1).
Moments
• Inflation. Let π t = a π + A π X t where A π = [a 1 a 2 a 3 ]. Since
The moments are:
inflation rate are the same. Relaxing these things may work, to some extent. Here's a start:
• Interest rate differential: i t − i * t . With symmetry we have that
With independence, the moments are
• UIP Coefficient. First the expected depreciation rate, with symmetry, is
So the covariance (with independence) is
Cov (i t − i * t , q t ) = Cov C i (X t − X * t ), A π Φ(X t − X * t ) = 2 C i Γ 0 Φ A π and the regression coefficient is b = C i Γ 0 Φ A π C i Γ 0 C i
Appendix D Linearization for the Pricing Kernel
The log of the equilibrium domestic marginal rate of substitution in equation (68) is given by log(m r t+1 ) = log β + (ρ − 1)x t+1 + (α − ρ)[log W t+1 − log µ t (W t+1 )], where x t+1 ≡ log(c t+1 /c t ) is the log of the ratio of domestic observed consumption in t + 1 relative to t and W t is the value function. The first two terms are standard expected utility terms: the pure time preference parameter β and a consumption growth term times the inverse of the negative of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The third term in the pricing kernel is a new term coming from EZ preferences.
We work on a linearized version of the real pricing kernel, following the findings of Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005) . In particular, I focus on the the value function of each representative agent, scaled by the observed equilibrium consumption level
, where I use the linear homogeneity of µ t . In logs,
where w t = log(W t /c t ) and u t ≡ log(µ t (exp(w t+1 + x t+1 ))). Taking a linear approximation of the right-hand side as a function of u t around the pointm, I get w t ≈ ρ −1 log[(1 − β) + β exp(ρm)] + β exp(ρm) 1 − β + β exp(ρm) (u t −m) ≡κ + κu t where κ < 1. Approximating aroundm = 0, results inκ = 0 and κ = β, and for the general case of ρ = 0, the "log aggregator", the linear approximation is exact withκ = 1 − β and κ = β.
Given the state variables of the economy, x, v and w, and the log-linear structure of the model, we conjecture a solution for the value function of the form, z t =ξ + ξ x x t + ξ v v t + ξ w w t , whereξ, ξ x , ξ v and ξ w are constants to be determined. Therefore z t+1 + x t+1 =ξ + (ξ x + 1)x t+1 + ξ v v t+1 + ξ w w t+1 and, using the properties of lognormal random variables, u t can be expressed as u t ≡ log(µ t (exp(z t+1 + x t+1 ))) = log(E t [exp(z t+1 + x t+1 ) α ]
Corr (r t+1 , r t ) = 1 − (1 − ϕ x )(γ • Inflation:
E(π t ) = a + a 1 θ x + a 2 θ v + a 3 θ w , Var (π t ) = a 2 1 Var (x t ) + a 2 2 Var (v t ) + a 2 3 Var (w t )
Corr (π t+1 , π t ) = 1 − (1 − ϕ x )a 2 1
Var (x t ) Var (π t )
Var (w t ) Var (π t )
corr(x t , π t ) = a 1 Stdev (x t ) Stdev (π t ) , corr(x t+1 , π t ) = a 1 ϕ x Stdev (xt) Stdev (πt)
• Nominal interest rate: 
